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The question of whether an attorney at law may draft a will for a
client in which the attorney names himself a beneficiary is generally
an unspoken, yet surprisingly frequent, problem which occurs in the
practice of law. In the classic case, the inquiry arises in situations in
which elderly clients have had long and trusting relationships with
their lawyers, and have no relatives or close friends to whom to be-
queath their property. However, the situation often arises in other
circumstances as well; for example, when a client wishes to thank her
attorney for services which have been or will be rendered, when a cli-
ent is personally very close to his attorney, and especially when the
client is a member of the attorney's immediate family.
Over the years, jurisdictions have attempted to resolve the inher-
ent conflicts implicit in such situations in several different ways. 1 For
example, some courts have reacted swiftly and harshly towards attor-
neys who draft wills for clients in which the lawyers name themselves
as beneficiaries, even in cases in which the client has insisted upon it.2
Most courts have held that a presumption of undue influence arises
under various factual circumstances3 due to the fiduciary nature of the
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1. See infra Section III.
2. See, e.g., State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963) (attorney repri-
manded for unprofessional conduct).
3. Facts in addition to the setting of the attorney as drafter and beneficiary are often
required for the presumption to operate. See, e.g., In re Haskell's Estate, 283
Mich. 513, 278 N.W. 668 (1938). See also infra Section III.
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transaction. The attorney may rebut the presumption, but often only
with clear and convincing evidence. 4 A few courts have simply looked
the other way.5 Surprisingly, the Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility6 tackled the problem primarily in the form of an Ethical Con-
sideration 7 only,8 with a mere admonition to avoid the practice if
possible. 9 More recently, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct0
attempt to solve the problem by banning the practice altogether, with
seemingly minor exceptions. 1  Far from settling the issue, however,
the Model Rules leave certain questions unanswered. This omission
tends to create new problems.
A comprehensive inquiry into the subject of testamentary gifts
from clients to their scrivener-attorneys has academic as well as prac-
tical implications, for the posture of the law has changed considerably
over the last three decades. In fact, the law in this area has undergone
a remarkable evolution, which evidences a striking, though perhaps
unanticipated and unnoticed, transition in the underlying rationale of
whether such testamentary gifts should be sanctioned. Indeed, an ex-
amination of the changes which have occurred over the last three de-
cades reveals a shift in the substantive underpinnings of the law's
treatment of testamentary gifts from clients to their attorneys-from
principles of probate law12 to seemingly hard and fast rules of profes-
sional responsibility. A closer look at the past and present state of the
law allows certain scholastic considerations to be examined and con-
clusions to be reached reached, all of which serves to illuminate the
complexity of the situation for the practicing attorney. Analysis of the
shifts in the law also contributes to the continual search for new ways
in which the problems raised by testamentary gifts from clients to
their attorneys may be minimized, if not altogether eliminated.
The purpose of this Article is to explore the evolution of the law's
treatment of the practice by attorneys of drafting wills for clients in
which the attorneys are named as beneficiaries. The Article begins
with an exploration of the early probate basis for addressing the prac-
tice-specifically, a presumption of undue influence which could only
4. See, e.g., McDowell v. Pennington, 394 So. 2d 323 (Miss. 1981); In re Butt's Estate,
201 Cal. 185, 256 P. 200 (1927).
5. See, e.g., Cave v. McLean, 66 Ohio App. 196, 32 N.E.2d 581 (1939).
6. See ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE].
7. [Hereinafter EC].
8. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-5 (1980).
9. The ethical considerations of the Model Code were originally intended as aspira-
tional objectives only. See id, Preliminary Statement, at 1c.
10. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
11. See id., Rule 1.8(c).
12. Although "probate" usually refers to the procedure by which a will is proved
valid or not, the word is used here in its broadest sense, specifically referring to
those rules of property and estate law which regulate testamentary transfers.
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be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. The Article proceeds
with an overview of the state of the law prior to the adoption of the
Model Code. The transition in the caselaw from probate concerns to
ethical ones is then examined, leading up to the Model Code's treat-
ment of the problem. Next, the applicable new Model Rule is ana-
lyzed, with particular emphasis on its limitations. Finally, a new rule
is proposed which, if adopted, would solve the problem entirely.
II. PROBATE CONSIDERATIONS: THE PRESUMPTION OF
UNDUE INFLUENCE AND THE EARLIER
STATE OF THE LAW
The precise question of whether an attorney may draft a will for a
client in which the attorney names himself a beneficiary can be traced
back to antiquity. In ancient Rome, the scrivener of a will could not
inherit under it.13 Although the earlier American decisions were not
as oppressive, the circumstance of an attorney naming herself a bene-
ficiary under a will drawn for a client was peculiarly susceptible to
charges of undue influence, largely because of the confidential rela-
tionship which exists between attorney and client.14 Most of the ear-
lier cases therefore focused on the concept -of undue influence.
Delving into the enigmatic nature of the influences which courts con-
sider "undue" is necessary for a complete understanding of the law's
early treatment of these cases.
The concept of "undue influence" in probate law resists simplistic
definition, primarily because it is an amorphous term used to charac-
terize particular acts or conduct by someone other than the testator
which improperly influence a testamentary disposition. The term is
easier to recognize than to define.
It seems hackneyed to point out that a testator is free, for the most
part, to leave his property to whomever he pleases.15 Probate law has
always permitted wide latitude in the ways in which a person may dis-
13. Digest of Justinian, 48.10.15. See T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS
261 (2d ed. 1953). It seems reasonable to assume that the injunction was man-
dated in order to protect the authenticity and propriety of testamentary transfers.
Indeed, the civil law still imposes such a prohibition. See Graham v. Courtright,
180 Iowa 394, 407, 161 N.W. 774, 778 (1917).
14. A confidential relationship may be defined as a fiduciary relationship between
two or more parties which results from the unlimited confidence or sense of duty
which the relationship naturally creates. The nature of the relationship requires
the utmost degree of candor and fair play. See G. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAw OF TRUSTS 351 (5th ed. 1973).
15. The right of a testator to dispose of his estate depends neither on the
justice of his prejudices nor soundness of his memory. He may do what
he will with his own; and if there be no defect in his testamentary capac-
ity, and no undue influence or fraud, the law gives effect to the will,
though its provisions are unreasonable and unjust.
In re Burns' Estate, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 512, 514, 52 S.W. 98, 99 (1899).
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pose of his property upon death. "The right of testamentary disposi-
tion of one's property as an incident of ownership, is by law made
absolute. It is a valuable right, closely protected by statute and judi-
cial opinion."16 This seemingly bland premise, however, serves to
highlight an extremely important consideration regarding the charac-
ter of undue influence, since the testamentary preferences must be in
accordance with the actual or presumed intent of the testator, and not
some other person. Undue influence improperly alters the intent of
the testator, which in turn directly affects the testamentary
disposition:
[U]ndue influence... mean[s] whatever destroys free agency and constrains
the person whose act is under review to do that which is contrary to his own
untrammelled desire. It may be caused by physical force, by duress, by threats,
or by importunity. It may arise from persistent and unrelaxing efforts in the
establishment or maintenance of conditions intolerable to the particular indi-
vidual. It may result from more subtle conduct designed to create an irresisti-
ble ascendancy by imperceptible means. It may be exerted by deceptive
devices or by material compulsion without actual fraud. Any species of coer-
cion, whether physical, mental or moral, which subverts the sound judgment
and genuine desire of the individual, is enough to constitute undue influence.
Its extent or degree is inconsequential so long as it is sufficient to substitute
the dominating purpose of another for the free expression of the wishes of the
person signing the instrument. 1 7
Undue influence, however, should not be confused with the benign
influence which persons exert on one another in the ordinary course
of daily activity, such as the influence which results from natural af-
fection.' 8 The most frequently used definition of undue influence re-
quires that the influence "destroy the testator's free agency and
substitute for his own another person's will."19 Courts sometimes ex-
press the elements necessary to reject a will or one of its provisions for
probate on the ground of undue influence as follows: (1) the testator
must have been subject to the influence; (2) the opportunity must
have existed for the exercise of undue influence at the time the will
was executed; (3) the person exerting the influence must have a pre-
disposition to exercise it; and (4) the procurement of the will or provi-
16. In re Martison's Estate, 29 Wash. 2d 912, 913, 190 P.2d 96, 97 (1948). In this coun-
try, the "right" of testamentary disposition is taken for granted. Because this
property right is almost exclusively a creature of statutory law, however, nothing
prevents a legislature, in theory at least, from abolishing the right of inheritance
altogether. As Justice Jackson pointed out in Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S.
556 (1942): "Rights of succession to the property of a deceased ... are of statutory
creation, and the dead hand rules succession only by sufferance. Nothing in the
Federal Constitution forbids the legislature of a state to limit, condition, or even
abolish the power of testamentary disposition over property within its jurisdic-
tion." Id. at 562.
17. Neill v. Brackett, 234 Mass. 367, 369, 126 N.E. 93, 94 (1920).
18. Bollinger v. Arkansas Valley Trust Co., 202 Ark. 525, 531, 151 S.W.2d 675, 678
(1941).
19. In re Arnold's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 573, 575, 107 P.2d 25, 27 (1940).
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sion must appear to be the result of the coercion.20
Due to the peculiar nature of the confidential relationship be-
tween attorney and client, then, the earlier cases concerning clients
who gifted property to their scrivener-attorneys naturally often spoke
in terms of undue influence, and particularly in terms of a presump-
tion thereof which frequently arose under such circumstances. 2 ' Un-
less the presumption was overcome, the gift was usually invalidated.
Although the cases were hardly uniform, they were firmly rooted in
probate law, which was rarely, if ever, questioned. The caselaw can no
doubt be explained, in part at least, by the fact that the only formal
ethical guidelines which existed for lawyers prior to the advent of the
Model Code were the old Canons of Professional Ethics,22 which did
not specifically address the issue. The only provisions even remotely
relevant to the problem were Canons Eleven and Twenty-nine. Ca-
non Eleven, entitled "Dealing with Trust Property," stated in part:
"The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal
benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed
in him by his client."23 Canon Twenty-nine, entitled "Upholding the
Honor of the Profession," also proclaimed, in part: "[A lawyer] should
strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of
the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration
of justice."24
Many courts thus invoked a rebuttable presumption of undue in-
fluence-a probate concept-when the client's will was drawn by an
attorney who benefited thereby. Most cases, however, stopped short
of holding that the fiduciary relationship between client and attorney
alone was sufficient to raise the presumption.2 5 The attorney must
have also drafted or participated in the drawing of the will in some
20. See In re Inda's Estate, 146 Neb. 179, 183, 19 N.W.2d 37, 40 (1945); In re Arnold's
Estate, 16 Cal. 573, 577, 107 P.2d 25, 27 (1940).
21. Courts often use the words "presumption" and "inference" interchangeably, even
though there is a difference between the two. "A presumption affects the duty of
producing further testimony, not merely the weight of that already produced.
The distinction can be made in that an inference is a permissive deduction, while
a presumption is a deduction to be drawn by law." In re Estate of Wagner, 265
N.W.2d 459, 463 (N.D. 1978).
22. See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908). The Canons were based principally
on the Code of Ethics adopted by the Alabama Bar Association in 1887. See
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preface (1980).
23. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 11 (1908).
24. Id. Canon 29.
25. The rule was otherwise for inter vivos transfers between attorney and client,
since the living are presumably in greater need of protection from the conse-
quences of their actions than the dead. See In re Cooper's Will, 75 N.J. Eq. 177,
181, 71 A. 676, 677 (1909), aff'd, Harrison v. Axtell, 76 N.J. Eq. 614, 75 A. 1100
(1910).
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way,2 6 or unduly benefited under the terms of the will.27 For instance,
in In re Lances' Estate,28 a lawyer drew a will, which left the entire
estate to the attorney, at the request of a mentally competent testator.
The Supreme Court of California noted: "Where one who unduly
profits by a will sustains a confidential relationship to the testator and
actively participates in procuring the execution of the will .... a pre-
sumption of undue influence [arises] which must be overcome by the
[attorney]."29 Even when the testator freely contracted with his attor-
ney for the attorney to receive a testamentary gift, and the contract
appeared fair, the presumption still operated.30
Mere opportunity and motive to influence the drafting, however,
were not considered sufficient by courts to give rise to the presump-
tion of undue influence, but rather simply raised a suspicion, which
amounted to no more than conjecture. 31 In other words, the evidence
at least had to be circumstantial. Moreover, attorneys were often able
to overcome the presumption. For example, in In re Cooper's Will,32
the attorney who drafted the testatrix's will was her legal advisor and
intimate friend for many years. The New Jersey Prerogative Court
pointed out:
Considering the relations of [the testatrix] with [her attorney], the provisions
for the [attorney] can hardly be called unnatural, however we may question
the wisdom of its bountiful character. It is not unnatural that she should have
wished to substantially remember a dear friend with whom, apparently, her
business relations had always been satisfactory, and to whose wife and family
she had become greatly attached .... The only reason that this court has
considered at length the question as to whether the will is natural or unnatu-
ral is for the purpose of ascertaining whether its provisions sprang from the
natural impulse of the testatrix or resulted from coercion. 3 3
Attorneys also tended to overcome the presumption if the "client"
were an immediate family member,34 or if the client had received in-
dependent legal advice regarding the preparation of the will.
3 5
Once the presumption arose, its effect varied according to jurisdic-
26. See Liddle v. Salter, 180 Iowa 840, 847, 163 N.W. 447, 450 (1917).
27. In re Butt's Estate, 201 Cal. 185, 188, 256 P. 200, 201 (1927). See, e.g., In re Bleil's
Estate, 96 Cal. App. 283, 273 P. 1088 (1929), in which the California District Court
of Appeal allowed the will to stand, because no affirmative proof was offered to
suggest that the attorney, other than being legal advisor to the testatrix, partici-
pated in or procured the execution of the will. Id. at 288, 273 P. at 1090.
28. 216 Cal. 397, 14 P.2d 768 (1932).
29. Id. at 402, 14 P.2d at 770.
30. In re Witt's Estate, 198 Cal. 407, 413, 245 P. 197, 202 (1926).
31. See Buckner v. Tuggle, 356 Mo. 718, 723-24, 203 S.W.2d 449, 452-53 (1947).
32. 75 N.J. Eq. 177, 71 A. 676 (1909), aff'd, Harrison v. Axtell, 76 N.J. Eq. 614, 75 A.
1100 (1910).
33. Id. at 189, 71 A. at 680.
34. See, e.g., Evans v. Trimble, 88 Misc. 667, 152 N.Y.S. 333, rev'd, 169 App. Div. 363,
155 N.Y.S. 25 (1915), appeal dismissed, 217 N.Y. 701, 112 N.E. 1058 (1916) (lawyer
prepared a new will for his wife in which he became the favored beneficiary).
35. See, e.g., In re Guidi's Will, 259 A.D. 652, 20 N.Y.S.2d 240, aff'd, 284 N.Y. 680, 30
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tional and even decisional preferences. Courts often spoke of the ef-
fect of the presumption as shifting the burden of proof from the
contestant to the proponent of the will, but usually this referred to the
burden of going forward with the evidence from a legal standpoint,
rather than the burden of persuading the fact finder. In one of the
better explanations of the presumption's effect, the Florida Supreme
Court reasoned:
What will a rule shifting to the proponent only the burden of coming forward
with the evidence mean in practice? First, the burden will be satisfied when
the beneficiary comes forward with a reasonable explanation for his or her
active role in the decedent's affairs.... Second, when the burden is satisfied,
the presumption will vanish... and the judge will be empowered to decide the
case in accord with the greater weight of the evidence. Third, since the facts
giving rise to the presumption are themselves evidence of undue influence,
those facts will remain in the case and will support a permissible inference of
undue influence, depending on the credibility and weight assigned by the trial
judge to the rebuttal testimony.3 6
Nevertheless, a few courts actually shifted the burden of proof
onto the attorney-proponent once the presumption was raised, which
placed the attorney in a virtually untenable position.3 7 Other courts
chose a "preponderance" evidentiary test to rebut the presumption of
undue influence.3 8 Many courts decided upon a "clear and convinc-
ing" test, largely because of the extremely confidential nature of the
attorney-client relationship. 39 Perhaps the best approach, however,
can be ascribed to those courts which adopted varying gradations of
the proof required to overcome the presumption, depending on the
facts of each case:
The strength of the presumption and the amount of proof required to over-
come it must depend upon the circumstances of each case. In the case of a
testator who [is] in feeble health, [and who disregards] the claims... of his...
family... [and] devises all his property to a confidential adviser, who, alone
with the testator, prepares the will and supervises its execution, the degree of
proof required to overcome the presumption will be much greater than in the
case of one having no near relatives .... who [is] in good physical and mental
health [and] goes to his legal adviser and has him prepare his wll ... disposing
of his property to strangers to his blood .... 40
N.E.2d 723 (1940), reh'g denied, 285 N.Y. 540, 32 N.E.2d 829 (1941) (attorney-bene-
ficiary recommended that client consult other counsel for advice).
36. In re Estate of Carpenter, 253 So. 2d 697, 704 (Fla. 1971). The meaning of "burden
of proof" and the legal effect of a presumption have been extensively treated by
commentators, and will not be considered here at length. For a more detailed
discussion of the subject, see 5 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERIcAN
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 434-53 (2d ed. 1923).
37. Since the testator would be unavailable to testify, it would be very difficult for
the attorney to prevail. See also In re Estate of Carpenter, 253 So.2d 697, 704 (Fla.
1971).
38. See In re Inda's Estate, 146 Neb. 179, 182, 19 N.W.2d 37, 41 (1945).
39. See, e.g., In re Butts Estate, 201 Cal. 185, 188, 256 P. 200, 201 (1927); Franciscan
Sisters Health Care Corp. v. Dean, 95 Ill. 2d 452, 463, 448 N.E.2d 872, 877-78 (1983).
40. Wunderlich v. Buerger, 287 Ill. 440, 445, 122 N.E. 827, 829 (1919).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
On the other hand, many of the earlier decisions refused to invoke
the presumption of undue influence. "The coincidence that the lawyer
who drew the will is also a legatee, without more, does not raise [the]
presumption ... ."41 Moreover, "the doctrine of independent advice,
[has] no pertinency to testamentary gifts," as long as the disposition
was clearly understood by the testator.42 One court expressed its view
more eloquently:
[S]uch a condition of affairs creates no presumption, but merely raises a suspi-
cion which ought to appeal to the vigilance of the court. Such wills are cer-
tainly not looked upon with favor. The court will cautiously and carefully
examine into the circumstances which are attendant upon their execution,
and will scan with a scrutinizing eye the evidence offered to procure their
probate. No presumption of undue influence invariably arises from the fact
that a will is drawn by a beneficiary under it .... It is a fact to be considered
with other facts. It is undoubtedly a suspicious fact; but its weight depends,
not solely upon its character, but upon the facts and circumstances with which
it is connected.
4 3
Even the earlier legal annotations noted that a considerable body
of caselaw permitted attorneys to draft wills for clients in which the
attorney received a legacy or devise.44 Many commentators seemed to
agree. For example, Drinker 45 wrote:
A question is sometimes raised as to the propriety of a lawyer's inserting in
the will a legacy to himself .... This, of course, depends on the surrounding
circumstances .... Where... a testator is entirely competent and the relation
has been a longstanding one, and where the suggestion originates with the
testator, there is no necessity of having another lawyer in the case of a reason-
able legacy .... 46
Whether the presumption of undue influence was deemed raised or
not, most, if not all, of the early cases addressed the drafting practice
in clear-cut terms. A presumption either did or did not operate. The
decisions addressed the issue of testamentary gifts in black and white
terms with little, if any, consideration given to the grey areas inherent
41. In re Bottier's Estate, 150 A. 786, 786 (N.J. 1930).
42. Id.
43. Graham v. Courtright, 180 Iowa 394, 407-08, 161 N.W. 774, 779 (1917) (quoting 1 H.
UNDERHILL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 137 at 195 (1900)). See also
Swarington v. Swanstrom, 67 Idaho 245, 175 P.2d 692 (1946).
44. See Annotation, Presumption and Burden of Proof as to Undue Influence on Tes-
tator, 66 A.L.R. 228 (1930); Annotation, Presumption and Burden of Proof as to
Undue Influence on Testator, 154 A.L.R. 583 (1945).
45. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS (1953).
46. Id. at 94 (footnote omitted). Indeed, as late as 1962, at least one court commented:
There is no rule that attorneys should never draw wills in which they
receive gifts. There is nothing improper in an attorney's drawing wills
for his family or for relatives, providing the gift to him is reasonable
under the circumstances. Similarly, there is nothing improper in draw-
ing wills for close friends or clients if the gift to the attorney is a modest
one.
Magee v. State Bar of Cal., 58 Cal. 2d 423, 433, 374 P.2d 807, 813, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839,
845 (1962). See generally Annotation, Re Estate of Smith, 19 A.L.R.3d 559 (1968).
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in the situation. Although the question of scrivener-attorneys as bene-
ficiaries may appear to be an easy one, it resists simplistic solution.
For instance, what if the client, completely free from any inkling of
undue influence, insists that her attorney draft a will which names
the attorney as a significant beneficiary? The attorney is then placed
in an unenviable position in which he virtually is forced either to
choose to commit a disservice to his client by not assisting the client to
the best of his ability, or to refer the client to another attorney, whose
services the client may not want and whom the client may even refuse
to consult. Should the attorney accede to the client's wishes or allow
the client to forego needed legal counsel altogether? This discussion,
of course, bespeaks an obvious fact which most of the early decisions
tended to ignore: an attorney's duty to his client sometimes conflicts
with his duty to himself and his profession. One court which did ad-
dress the issue stated: "[T]he attorney placed himself in a very indeli-
cate and highly improper position, which made it necessary for him to
produce voluminous testimony... ."47 Many years passed, however,
before courts uniformly and consistently became visibly concerned
about the clear ethical problems implicit in the situation in which an
attorney is named as a beneficiary under a will which he has drafted
for a client.
III. THE LATER APPROACHES TO THE UNSETTLING
PRESUMPTION PRIOR TO THE MODEL CODE
The discussion thus far illustrates how little uniformity existed
among the early cases. Nevertheless, the concept of undue influence
continued to reign supreme in most of the later decisions, with scant
attention paid to the ethical considerations involved.48 In order to fo-
cus on the evolutionary process from probate to professional responsi-
bility concerns in this area, the differing approaches-finally codified
by most jurisdictions prior to the adoption of the Model Code by most
states-become relevant and instructive in understanding the ap-
proaches ultimately taken by the Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.49 An analysis of
these approaches, grouped by category,50 reveals two basic tenets:
47. In re Cooper's Will, 75 N.J. Eq. 177, 194, 71 A. 676, 682 (1909), aff'd, Harrison v.
Axtell, 76 N.J. Eq. 614, 75 A. 1100 (1910).
48. Although a few decisions did begin to deal more noticeably with the ethical
problems inherent in the situation, courts infrequently disciplined attorneys for
engaging in the drafting practice, even after the American Bar Association
adopted the Model Code in 1969. For a more detailed discussion of the "Law in
Transition," see infra Section IV.
49. The Model Code was not adopted by the overwhelming majority of states until
the late 1970s.
50. Every attempt has been made to delineate categories, and the jurisdictions within
those categories, as precisely as possible, although reasonable persons may differ
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(1) the overwhelming majority of states eventually adopted a rebutta-
ble presumption of undue influence standard when confronted with
the issue, and (2) the burden of proof required to overcome the pre-
sumption almost always required clear and convincing evidence.
A. The Attorney-Draftsman Merely as Beneficiary
Courts in a few states chose to treat the situation of the attorney-
scrivener as beneficiary in harsh fashion. For example, in Orr v.
Love,51 the Supreme Court of Arkansas noted that "[w]hen a will is
written ... by a person benefiting by it, or by one standing in the
relation of attorney or counsel, and who is also benefited by it," the
circumstances require a presumption of undue influence.52 In fact, the
court, in a later case, went so far as to hold that when a will was
drafted by the primary beneficiary, whether an attorney or not, the
beneficiary-proponent had to prove a lack of undue influence beyond a
reasonable doubt.53 Courts in two other states treated the situation
similarly. In Caine v. Larson,54 the Oregon Supreme Court adopted a
presumption of invalidity of the will or provision, based on undue in-
fluence, even when the gift was made to the attorney's secretary
rather than to the attorney himself.55 The Nevada Supreme Court also
opted for the severe approach: "[W]hen an attorney drafts a will for a
client, and the will contains a gift to the attorney, the law raises a
rebuttable presumption that the gift was the result of undue influ-
ence."5 6 These jurisdictions, then, evidently had little tolerance for the
situation in which an attorney drafts a will in which she is named as a
beneficiary, even if the lawyer were innocently to insert a gift to her-
self in a will prepared by her at the direction of her client.
at times as to the placement of a particular jurisdiction in a particular category,
especially since the elements of one category may, at times, arguably overlap with
those of another. In addition, certain states, such as Connecticut, Delaware, Ha-
waii, Idaho, Maine, and New Hampshire appear to have no caselaw directly on
point. See also Note, Attorney Beware-The Presumption of Undue Influence
and the Attorney-Beneficiary, 47 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 330 (1971); Note, Problem
Areas in Will Drafting Under New York Law, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 459, 473-79
(1982).
51. 225 Ark. 505, 283 S.W.2d 667 (1955).
52. Id. at 510, 283 S.W.2d at 670 (quoting McDaniel v. Crosby, 19 Ark. 533, 550 (1858)).
53. Greenwood v. Witson, 267 Ark. 68, 588 S.W.2d 701, 703 (1979). The court evi-
dently believed the circumstance was serious enough to warrant the highest
standard of proof to rebut the presumption. See id. at 74, 588 S.W.2d at 703.
54. 234 Or. 384, 383 P.2d 74 (1963).
55. Id. at 411, 383 P.2d at 86. The Oregon rule was later extended to the situation in
which a guardian of an incompetent testator retained the drafting attorney and
was then made a beneficiary under the will. See Whitteberry v. Whitteberry, 9
Or. App. 154, 496 P.2d 240 (1972).
56. Peterson v. Flanary, 77 Nev. 87, 97, 360 P.2d 259, 271 (1961).
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B. The Attorney-Draftsman and the Existence
of Suspicious Circumstances
Most courts preferred a less oppressive rule. The courts of two
states, in particular, serve as models in their use of a generalized "sus-
picious circumstances" test. Under the test, if an attorney drafted a
will naming himself a beneficiary, and additional circumstances of a
questionable or suspicious character surrounded the transaction, a
presumption of undue influence arose which could be rebutted only by
clear and convincing evidence.57 The supplemental circumstances,
however, needed only be slight, as the New Jersey Supreme Court
pointed out in the case of a testator who made an "unnatural" disposi-
tion of his property to his attorney, to the exclusion of the natural
objects of the testator's bounty.58 Even if the testatrix was simply in-
fluenced by her attorney to choose another particular attorney to
draw her will, which named her original attorney as a beneficiary, the
presumption operated.59 Mississippi courts employed a like premise,
using the doctrine of presumptive invalidity if the suspect circum-
stances were attendant to the will's execution.60 In fact, in In re
Moses,61 the Supreme Court of Mississippi disallowed a gift of the tes-
tatrix's entire estate to her attorney, who had been an intimate friend
for many years, even though the will was prepared by supposedly dis-
interested counsel.62 Maryland courts also favored a kind of presump-
tive invalidity test. If an attorney largely benefited from a will
prepared by him, any dispute which later arose between attorney and
client rendered the will or bequest prima facie invalid.63 Again, once
the presumption arose, clear and convincing evidence was necessary to
rebut it.64
1. 'Active Involvement" in the Preparation or Execution
of the Will
Courts in many other states, however, were somewhat less restric-
tive in their approach, and required that the suspicious circumstances
be more particularized in order for the presumption to arise. Specifi-
cally, the attorney must have been actively engaged or involved or
have participated in the procurement, preparation, or execution of the
will. Florida courts epitomized this approach: not only did the attor-
ney have to draft the will and name himself a beneficiary, but he also
57. In re Davis' Will, 14 N.J. 185, 101 A.2d 521 (1953).
58. Blake v. McConnell, 21 N.J. 50, 56, 120 A.2d 745, 747-48 (1956).
59. In re Estate of Lehner, 142 N.J. Super. 56, 60, 360 A.2d 400, 406 (1975).
60. Bilello v. Smith, 317 So. 2d 916, 918 (Miss. 1975).
61. 227 So. 2d 829 (Miss. 1969).
62. Id. at 834.
63. Cook v. Hollyday, 185 Md. 656, 668, 45 A.2d 761, 766 (1946).
64. See, e.g., McDowell v. Pennington, 394 So. 2d 323, 325 (Miss. 1981).
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had to actively procure, in some way, the execution of the will.65 How-
ever, one Florida case defined "active procurement" very broadly, us-
ing such criteria as: (1) whether the attorney-beneficiary was present
at the execution of the will; (2) whether the attorney-beneficiary was
present on those occasions when the testator expressed a desire to
make a will; (3) whether the attorney-beneficiary recommended a spe-
cific attorney to draw the will; (4) whether the attorney-beneficiary
knew the contents of the will prior to its execution; (5) whether the
attorney-beneficiary gave instructions to the attorney drafting the will
regarding its preparation; (6) whether the attorney-beneficiary se-
cured witnesses to the will; and (7) whether the attorney-beneficiary
retained possession of the will subsequent to its execution.66
Most courts using the "active involvement" test, however, used
more general language: the attorney simply had to involve himself
with the preparation and execution of the will, 6 7 or affirmatively con-
cern himself in some way with its execution and preparation.68 The
more generalized language allowed courts more leeway to tailor their
decisions to the facts of each case.6 9 For instance, the Indiana Supreme
Court applied the rule to situations in which a member of the attor-
ney's immediate family was named as a beneficiary rather than the
attorney himself,7 0 and the Iowa Supreme Court demanded that the
legacy to the attorney be large in comparison with the total value of
the estate.71
2. "Unduly Profiting" Under the Will
Many more states used a somewhat different test to pinpoint the
concept of "suspicious circumstances." These jurisdictions, for the
most part, used langauge to the effect that the attorney had to "sub-
stantially benefit" under the will,72 receive the bulk of the testator's
65. Zinnser v. Gregory, 77 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1955).
66. In re Estate of Carpenter, 253 So. 2d 697, 702 (Fla. 1971).
67. Hollon's Executor v. Graham, 280 S.W.2d 544 (Ky. 1955).
68. Gehm v. Brown, 125 Colo. 555,245 P.2d 865 (1952); In re Estate of Swan, 4 Utah 2d
277, 293 P.2d 682 (1956).
69. See Hubbell v. Houston, 441 P.2d 1010, 1018 (Okla. 1968). See also Burke v.
Thomas, 282 Ala. 412, 211 So. 2d 903 (1968); In re Estate of Cocanougher, 141
Mont. 16, 375 P.2d 1009 (1962); In re Estate of Garfield, 192 Neb. 461, 222 N.W.2d
369 (1974); Hummer v. Betenbough, 75 N.M. 274, 280, 404 P.2d 110, 115 (1965);
McNeill v. McNeill, 223 N.C. 178, 25 S.E.2d 615 (1943); Apollonio v. Kenyon, 101
R.I. 578, 596, 225 A.2d 778, 788 (1967); Taliaferro v. Green, 622 S.W.2d 829, 837
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
70. Sweeney v. Vierbuchen, 224 Ind. 341, 66 N.E.2d 764 (1946).
71. Olsen v. Corporation of New Melleray, 245 Iowa 407, 414, 60 N.W.2d 832, 837
(1953). See In re Estate of Ramsey, 252 Iowa 48, 105 N.W.2d 657 (1960).
72. In re Estate of Vollbrecht, 26 Mich. App. 430, 436, 182 N.W.2d 609, 613 (1970).
[Vol. 66:695
1987] DRAFTING ATTORNEY IS A BENEFICIARY 707
property,73 be designated as the principal,74 major, main,75 or substan-
tial 76 beneficiary, or somehow "unduly profit"7 7 under the will. As
the Supreme Court of South Dakota demonstrated in two cases, the
term "unduly profit" could also be interpreted broadly to encompass
both a situation in which an attorney drafted a client's will under
which the attorney received the entire estate, 78 and also a situation in
which the attorney-beneficiary was not a natural object of the testa-
tor's bounty.79 The Illinois courts concurred, holding that, even if the
testator's attorney were merely named trustee of a large trust and had
broad discretionary powers, a good deal of proof would be required in
order to overcome the presumption of undue influence.8 0 Minnesota
courts held likewise if the attorney-scrivener's children 8l or fatherS2
was named beneficiary. In New York, a similar rule was observed.83
Although attorneys sometimes prevailed over the contestants of a
will, the New York courts emphasized that, in order to rebut the pre-
sumption by clear and convincing evidence, the attorney had to ade-
quately explain the circumstances of the gift and show that the gift
was made freely and willingly by the client.84
C. The Attorney-Draftsman and Statutory Prohibition
Only one state, Kansas, has a statutory provision which directly
addresses the circumstance of an attorney who receives a gift under a
will which he has prepared.8 5 The statute states, in relevant part:
If it shall appear that any will was written or prepared by the sole or principal
73. In re Estate of Teed, 288 P.2d 921, 922 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
74. In re Estate of Thompson, 1 Ariz. App. 18, 23, 398 P.2d 926, 931 (1965). See also
Paskvan v. Mesich, 455 P.2d 229 (Alaska 1969); In re Nelson's Estate, 72 Wyo. 444,
266 P.2d 238 (1954).
75. See Croft v. Snidow, 183 Va. 649, 651, 33 S.E.2d 208, 211 (1945); Savage v. Nute, 180
Va. 394, 403, 23 S.E.2d 133, 137-38 (1942).
76. Pasternak v. Mashak, 392 S.W.2d 631, 636 (Mo. 1965); In re Estate of Smith, 68
Wash. 145, 153, 411 P.2d 879, 881 (1966); Frye v. Norton, 148 W. Va. 500, 513, 135
S.E.2d 603, 611 (1964).
77. In re Estate of Nelson, 274 N.W.2d 584, 588 (S.D. 1978).
78. Id.
79. See generally In re Estate of Fleege, 89 S.D. 137, 230 N.W.2d 230 (1975). See also
Oglesby v. Harris, 130 S.W. 2d 449 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
80. Teter v. Spooner, 279 Ill. 39, 116 N.E. 673 (1917). Indeed, notwithstanding the
fact that the attorney did not prepare the will, but instead merely superintended
its execution, the presumption still arose. See Dial v. Welker, 328 Ill. 56, 159 N.E.
286 (1927).
81. In re Estate of Peterson, 283 Minn. 446, 168 N.W.2d 502 (1969).
82. In re Estate of Reiland, 292 Minn. 460, 194 N.W.2d 289 (1972).
83. In re Estate of Hayes, 49 Misc. 2d 152, 153, 267 N.Y.S.2d 452, 453-54 (1966).
84. In re Estate of Eckert, 93 Misc. 2d 677, 681, 403 N.Y.S.2d 633, 635 (1978).
85. Although two other states, Georgia and Louisiana, have statutes which, at first
glance, can be considered relevant to the situation, the caselaw in both states indi-
cates that they are not truly on point. See infra Section D.
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beneficiary in such will, who, at the time of writing or preparing the same, was
the confidential agent or legal adviser of the testator. ... such will shall not be
held to be valid unless it shall affirmatively appear that the testator had read
or knew of the contents of such will, and had independent advice with refer-
ence thereto.8 6
It should be noted that the statute applies only to "principal" or
"sole" beneficiaries, and can be overcome by ensuring that the testator
fully comprehends the contents of his will, and by providing him with
"independent" counsel. However, nowhere does the statute define
"principal" beneficiary, nor does it state what "independent advice"
consists of, or from whom it should come.
The Kansas caselaw, sparse as it is, seems to indicate that the stat-
ute will be construed strictly. For example, in In re Estate of Bar-
clay,87 the Kansas Supreme Court pointed out that an attorney was
not a principal beneficiary when his share, although significant as
compared to the total estate, was smaller than others under the will.88
Another Kansas case indicated that the word "prepared" in the statute
would also be interpreted narrowly, and would not apply to the situa-
tion in which a confidential advisor merely furnished the names of the
beneficiaries to the testator.8 9
D. The Attorney-Draftsman and the Lack of a Presumption
A few jurisdictions declared that no presumption of undue influ-
ence existed when a lawyer drew a will under which she was named as
a beneficiary. The Supreme Court of North Dakota, for instance, de-
cided that a presumption did not invariably arise when a will was
drawn for a client by an attorney who became a major beneficiary
thereunder, since the conditions under which such wills were drawn
varied too greatly to apply a hard and fast rule.90 Instead, the situa-
tion merely created a question of fact for the jury.91 The Ohio courts
voiced a similar rule, and indicated that no presumption, inference, or
invalidity would arise if the attorney named as beneficiary also drafted
the will,92 as long as there was no evidence that the attorney had
abused his position of trust with his client.93
Although Louisiana has a statute which prohibits physicians or
86. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-605 (1983).
87. 215 Kan. 129, 523 P.2d 376 (1974).
88. Id.
89. In re Estate of Robinson, 231 Kan. 300, 644 P.2d 420 (1982).
90. Stormon v. Weiss, 65 N.W.2d 475, 517 (N.D. 1954).
91. Id. at 518. Massachusetts also appeared to believe that such a situation was not
determinative, although the circumstances would be viewed with considerable
circumspection. See Wood v. McDonald, 332 Mass. 220, 222, 124 N.E.2d 264, 265
(1955).
92. Cave v. McLean, 66 Ohio App. 196, 203-04, 32 N.E.2d 581, 584-85 (1939).
93. See Caswell v. Lermann, 85 Ohio App. 200, 206, 88 N.E.2d 405, 408 (1948).
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ministers from receiving any kind of testamentary gift from a termi-
nal patient or penitent,94 the Louisiana Court of Appeal noted the ab-
sence of any state rule which would prohibit an attorney from taking
under a will which he prepared, even when he is the principal benefi-
ciary thereunder.95 Georgia, too, has a statute which, at first blush,
arguably could be construed to reach such conduct,96 but, again, the
Georgia courts evidently adopted the no-presumption rule in cases in
which one in a confidential relationship with the testator drafted a
will in which the advisor was made a beneficiary.97
Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of state courts adopted a
presumption of undue influence as the selected sanction when con-
fronted with such conduct. Little, if any, consideration was given to
the ethical implications of such conduct. However, this state of affairs
was soon to change.
IV. THE LAW IN TRANSITION
Prior to the adoption of the Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility in 1969 by the American Bar Association, precious few courts
rendered decisions which highlighted the ethical problems involved in
situations in which attorneys drew wills for clients which named the
attorneys as beneficiaries. In fact, the law remained static for some
time in many jurisdictions. One reason for this state of affairs was no
doubt the fact that the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which were
the only formal ethical guidelines for lawyers prior to the Model Code,
did not really address the situation,98 perhaps because it was assumed
that lawyers, as consummate professionals, would conduct themselves
in a proper and scrupulous manner-an assumption which unfortu-
nately no longer rings true. However, even after the adoption of the
Model Code by the American Bar Association, most courts continued
to view the problem in probate terms, with only a handful prioritizing
the ethical considerations.9 9 Probate concepts, being part and parcel
of property and estate law, were well-settled rules which were diffi-
cult to abandon.
94. 5 LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1489 (West 1987).
95. Gibson v. Grumbel, 333 So. 2d 340, 341 (La. 1976). It should be noted, however,
that Louisiana does not recognize undue influence as a ground for invalidating a
will. Id. at 342.
96. See GA. CODE § 53-2-42 (1982), which states, in relevant part: "Knowledge of the
contents [of a will] is necessary to the validity of a will.... However, if the scriv-
ener [is] a large beneficiar[y] under the will, greater proof shall be necessary to
show knowledge of the contents by the testator."
97. See White v. Irwin, 220 Ga. 836, 142 S.E.2d 255 (1965).
98. See supra text accompanying note 22.
99. It must be remembered, however, that a majority of states did not adopt the
Model Code until several years after its adoption by the American Bar
Association.
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Nevertheless, a few courts gradually began to hint at the ethical
implications inherent in the situation. Considerations of undue influ-
ence began to give way to concerns about conflicts of interest. For
example, in In re Davis' Will,100 a testatrix named her attorney's chil-
dren as beneficiaries under her will, which the attorney had drafted.
Although still speaking from a probate perspective, the New Jersey
Supreme Court was one of the first to emphasize ethical concerns
about this practice when it asserted, as early as 1953:
We wish to emphasize what has been said repeatedly by our courts as to the
proprieties of a situation where the testat[or] wishes to make [his] attorney or
a member of his immediate family a beneficiary under a will. Ordinary pru-
dence requires that such a will be drawn by some other lawyer of the tes-
tat[or's] own choosing, so that any suspicion of undue influence is thereby
avoided.1 0 1
As time went on, other courts increasingly began to address the situa-
tion primarily in terms of ethical considerations rather than probate
concerns.
0 2
One of the first disciplinary cases squarely based on the profes-
sional conduct of an attorney named as a beneficiary under a client's
will which he drafted came from Nebraska. In State ex rel. Nebraska
State Bar Ass'n. v. Richards,O3 a lawyer drew a will for a client in
which the lawyer named himself the principal beneficiary, albeit at
the insistence of the testatrix. After a series of unsuccessful proce-
dural skirmishes, 04 the Attorney General of Nebraska, on behalf of
the Nebraska State Bar Association, alleged that the attorney was
guilty of unprofessional conduct under the Canons of Professional
Ethics.105 Although the Supreme Court of Nebraska did not agree
with the accusation, 106 the court did observe:
Attorneys for clients who wish to leave them.., a bequest or devise of part of
their property, which they have a perfect right to do, will do well to have the
will drawn by some other lawyer. But if a client insists on having his ...
attorney draft a will containing such a provision we can see no reason why the
attorney should refuse to do so and thereby defeat his client's wishes. How-
ever, when such is the case the attorney's responsibilities.., are much greater
100. 14 N.J. 166, 101 A.2d 521 (1953).
101. In re Davis' Will, 14 N.J. 166, 171, 101 A.2d 521, 523-24 (1953). In this regard, see
In re Cooper's Will, 75 N.J. Eq. 177, 71 A. 676 (1909), supra note 47. See Annota-
tion, Presumption or Inference of Undue Influence from Testamentary Gift to
Relative, Friend, or Associate of Person Preparing Will or Procuring its Execu-
tion, 13 A.L.R.3d 381 (1967).
102. See also Annotation, Drawing Will or Deed under Which He Figures as Grantee,
Legatee, or Devisee as Ground of Disciplinary Action against Attorney, 98
A.L.R.2d 1234 (1964).
103. 165 Neb. 80, 84 N.W.2d 136 (1957).
104. Id. at 82-83, 84 N.W.2d at 139-40.
105. The attorney also represented himself as administrator of the decedent's estate,
receiving both administrator's and attorney's fees. Id. at 87, 84 N.W.2d at 142.
106. Id. at 94, 84 N.W.2d at 146.
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107
A few years later, the California Supreme Court tackled the prob-
lem from a more comprehensive ethical vantage point. In Magee v.
State Bar of California,0 8 an attorney drew a will, naming himself
residuary beneficiary of an elderly client's estate. Although the State
Board of Bar Governors recommended that the attorney be suspended
from practice for two years,109 the California Supreme Court did not
concur. A major reason for the court's decision, however, was the fact
that a virtually independent attorney had reviewed the will, para-
graph by paragraph, with the client, and had clearly established that
the client understood the disposition she wished to make and the rea-
sons therefor. Although the client resented being questioned about
her preferences by the independent attorney,110 the court cautioned:
For the very reason that the boundary between ethical and unethical behavior
in such cases is not clearly defined, attorneys should avoid drawing wills con-
taining gifts to themselves under circumstances in which there is a reasonable
basis for suspicion that the client was overreached or that the gift would pre-
vent the attorney from acting in the client's best interests. Such a practice
would remove any temptation to deal unfairly and would protect the reputa-
tion of the profession.1 1 1
However, the court went on to assert: "There is no rule that attorneys
should never draw wills in which they receive gifts."112 Furthermore,
[T]here is nothing improper in [an attorney's] drawing wills for close friends
or for clients if the gift to the attorney is a modest one. As the instant case
suggests, however, attorneys take a grave risk in drawing wills in which they
receive more than a modest gift that is in keeping with the nature of the rela-
tionship they have with the client.
1 13
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in State v. Horan,114 was one of
the first courts to actually invoke a disciplinary sanction against an
attorney who drafted a will for a close friend and client in which the
attorney was given a substantial bequest. Significantly, no claim of
undue influence was asserted, largely due to the longstanding per-
107. Id. at 94-95, 84 N.W. 2d at 146 (citations omitted).
108. 58 Cal. 2d 423, 374 P.2d 807, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1962).
109. At the time, Canon 11 of the CANONS OF PROFEssIONAL ETHics stated: "The law-
yer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he
abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client." In
interpreting this canon, the Ethics Committee of the American Bar Association
had previously stated: "[In cases where the testator desires.., to leave [his attor-
ney] a legacy, the lawyer should consider having the testator submit the will to
another lawyer prior to its execution." ABA Committee on Professional Ethics
and Grievances, Decision 266 (1957).
110. Magee v. State Bar of California, 58 Cal. 2d 423, 427-30, 374 P.2d 807, 810-11, 24
Cal. Rptr. 839, 842-43 (1962).
111. Id. at 431, 374 P.2d at 812, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
112. Id. at 433, 374 P.2d at 813, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
113. Id. (citation omitted).
114. 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963).
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sonal relationship between the attorney and the decedent.115 In repri-
manding the attorney for his conduct, the court emphasized that:
[t]he conflict of interests, the incompetency of an attorney-beneficiary to tes-
tify because of a transaction with the deceased, the possible jeopardy of the
will if its admission to probate is contested, the possible harm done to other
beneficiaries and the undermining of the public trust and confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession, are only some of the dangers which a lawyer
must consider [in this type of transaction]. 1 1 6
The court further specified that, even in the most benign circum-
stances, the attorney should have insisted that a disinterested attorney
of the client's own choosing be engaged to draft the will.117
The Wisconsin court, however, perhaps unwilling to go further
than the older "presumption of undue influence" rule, refused to im-
pose a flat ethical prohibition. Indeed, the court acknowledged that
certain conduct was permissible:
We do not mean to state that a lawyer may never draw a will for a personal
friend or members of his family or close relatives in which he... is a benefici-
ary. A lawyer may draft a will [for a family member or friend] if the proposed
legacy to himself ... is reasonable and natural under the circumstances...
and no reasonable grounds in fact exist for the ... public to have reasonable
cause to lose confidence in the integrity of the bar .... 118
Nevertheless,
[I]f the attorney acted as draftsman of the will and there are any circum-
stances either because of preferential treatment in relationship to others or if
the bequest is more than a token or modest bequest from a personal friend...
the inference [of undue influence] arises and would reasonably lead the public
to question the integrity of the lawyer.... [The] lawyer should draw a will in
these circumstances only after fully advising his client of the effect thereof
and when he is justified in believing that there is or will be independent com-
petent evidence which rebuts the inference.1 1 9
The Horan case broke new ground by disciplining an attorney for
preparing a client's will in which the attorney was named as a benefi-
ciary.120 Other courts soon followed suit. The Oregon Supreme Court,
for instance, in a case reprimanding an attorney for failing to insist
115. Id. at 69, 123 N.W.2d at 489.
116. Id. at 70, 123 N.W.2d at 490.
117. Id. at 73, 123 N.W.2d at 491.
118. Id. at 74, 123 N.W.2d at 492. The Wisconsin rule was apparently later incorpo-
rated into the Model Rules. See infra text accompanying note 177.
119. State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 74, 123 N.W.2d 488, 492 (1963).
120. Wisconsin gradually tightened the vise in later decisions. See, e.g., State v. Beau-
dry, 53 Wis. 2d 148, 191 N.W.2d 842 (1971) (reprimand and censure of attorney-
beneficiary who selected another attorney to act as scrivener in drafting client's
will); State v. Haberla, 39 Wis. 2d 334, 159 N.W.2d 11 (1968) (per curiam repri-
mand of attorney-beneficiary); State v. Collentine, 39 Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d 50
(1968) (attorney admonished even though he ensured that the testator's judgment
to name him as a beneficiary was independent). See also State v. Eisenberg, 29
Wis. 2d 233, 138 N.W.2d 235 (1965) (attorney reprimanded for drafting will which
benefited his mother rather than himself).
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that his client obtain independent legal advice before bequeathing his
entire estate to the attorney, stated matter-of-factly: "Any lawyer
should know, without being told, that when a client wants to make a
testamentary provision for the benefit of the lawyer, that lawyer
should withdraw from any participation in the preparation and execu-
tion of the will. [This is an] inflexible ethical rule."121
With the adoption of the Model Code in 1969122, the American Bar
Association, perhaps taking its cue in part from the emerging caselaw,
continued the fledgling trend by attempting to fashion some coherent
public policy regulating such conduct. Although several sections of the
Model Code were relevant to the situation, none was determinative.123
Canon One of the Model Code emphasizes that a lawyer should
always maintain the integrity and competence of the legal profession,
and EC 1-5 warns that a lawyer should refrain from "morally repre-
hensible conduct."24 Canon Nine expresses the generalized senti-
ment that a lawyer should avoid even the appearance of
impropriety.125 Only Canon Five and its attendant EC 5-5, however,
contain language which bears directly on the conduct at issue. Canon
Five states: "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional
Judgment on Behalf of a Client." EC 5-5 continues:
A lawyer should not suggest to his client that a gift be made to himself or for
his benefit. If a lawyer accepts a gift from his client, he is peculiarly suscepti-
ble to the charge that he unduly influenced or over-reached the client. If a
client voluntarily offers to make a gift to his lawyer, the lawyer may accept
the gift, but before doing so, he should urge that his client secure disinterested
advice from an independent, competent person who is cognizant of all the cir-
cumstances. Other than in exceptional circumstances, a lawyer should insist
that an instrument in which his client desires to name him beneficially be
121. In re Jones, 254 Or. 617, 618, 462 P.2d 680, 680 (1969). Curiously, the Oregon court
cited no prior caselaw or codifications to support its statement. Perhaps the court
looked to the emerging Model Code for guidance.
122. The Model Code was adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in 1969, although it
did not become effective until January 1, 1970. See MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SioNAL RESPONSIBILITY Preface (1969).
123. The Model Code was drafted and adopted by the ABA in order to provide more
specific guidance about the professional conduct required of lawyers, which the
older Canons of Professional Ethics had failed to do. Id.
The Model Code consists of three interrelated parts: canons, ethical considera-
tions (EC's), and disciplinary rules (DR's). The canons are statements of axio-
matic norms, generalized statements expressing the standard of professional
conduct expected within the legal profession. The EC's are aspirational in char-
acter, and represent objectives toward which every lawyer should strive. Only
the DR's, however, were intended as mandatory in character, stating the mini-
mum level of conduct below which no lawyer may fall without being subject to
disciplinary action. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Prelimi-
nary Statement (1980).
124. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5 (1980). See also id., DR 1-
102(A)(4), (5).
125. See also id., EC 9-2, 9-6.
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prepared by another lawyer selected by the client.1 2 6
Unfortunately, EC 5-5 is merely aspirational in character. In addi-
tion, nowhere does EC 5-5 define "exceptional circumstances." How-
ever, the ABA Ethics Committee, in an informal opinion, did indicate
that one exceptional circumstance occurred when a lawyer prepared a
will for his spouse which named himself beneficiary. 27 Even so, the
Committee advised: "[A] lawyer in some cases is vulnerable to later
accusation of impropriety. If he has any doubt that there are support-
ing facts in the surrounding circumstances buttressing such an accusa-
tion, he should advise the selection of independent counsel."128 In fact,
"a lack of parental relationship with [other beneficiaries] would be a
circumstance worthy of note."12 9 Moreover, "the ethical lawyer
should prudently suggest that even his own spouse claim [independ-
ent] counsel .. .when the circumstances raise any reasonable doubt
that the will of the spouse would be legally enforcible [sic]."130
Another problem with EC 5-5 is that inter vivos and testamentary
gifts seem to be treated similarly, even though each type of gift ap-
pears to warrant different considerations. Nevertheless, despite the
broad, unspecific language, a growing number of courts began to use
this section of the Model Code to indicate that the practice of an attor-
ney naming himself beneficiary under a client's will would not be tol-
erated. Accordingly, the rationale behind these decisions was couched
more and more frequently in terms of ethical principles rather than
probate rules, although some courts naturally still continued to speak
of probate concerns.1 31 Even so, the overall number of cases which
actually disciplined attorneys for such conduct was still not very large,
perhaps because the very nature of EC 5-5 is more discretionary than
mandatory, by the Model Code's own admission.132 Notwithstanding,
many courts began imposing ethical sanctions on attorneys in light of
the overall tenor of the Model Code, which was in keeping with Jus-
tice White's statement in In re Ruffalo:133 "[M]embers of the bar can
be assumed to know that certain kinds of conduct, generally con-
demned by responsible men, will be grounds for disbarment. This
class of conduct.., includes conduct which all responsible attorneys
126. Id. (emphasis added). EC 5-6 also appears relevant: "A lawyer should not con-
sciously influence a client to name him as executor, trustee, or lawyer in an in-
strument. In those cases in which a client wishes to name his lawyer as such, care
should be taken by the lawyer to avoid even the appearance of impropriety."




131. See, e.g., In re Anderson, 52 Ill. 2d 202, 206, 287 N.E.2d 682, 684 (1972).
132. See also Park v. George, 282 Ark. 155, 667 S.W.2d 644 (1984).
133. 390 U.S. 544 (1968) (procedural due process required in state disbarment
proceedings).
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would recognize as improper for a member of the profession."134
The shift in emphasis from probate to professional responsibility
concerns therefore began to accelerate. For example, in Florida Bar v.
Schonbrun,135 the Supreme Court of Florida declared that an attorney
who refused a testamentary gift from his client but then drew the will
naming, instead, the attorney's sister as residuary legatee warranted
public reprimand.3 6 Later, in In re Saladino,37 the Supreme Court
of Illinois decided that an attorney who, inter alia, named himself sole
residuary legatee in a client's will without advising her to seek in-
dependent legal advice deserved to be suspended from practice for
three months.138 The rationale behind the court's disciplinary deci-
sion, however, was based on the presumption of undue influence,
which had not been rebutted. 39 The Illinois court did explicitly speak
in ethical terms, however, in the subsequent case of In re Vogel,14o in
which the court censured an attorney who drafted for a client a series
of wills and trust documents in which the attorney was named as a
beneficiary.' 4'
Such conduct, however, was still permissible in Illinois under cer-
tain circumstances. For example, in In re Barrick,142 an attorney
drafted, at the insistence of his client, a will which provided that the
attorney was to receive a lifetime annuity. The Illinois Supreme Court
dismissed the disciplinary charges against the attorney because the at-
torney had acted properly by making full disclosure to his client of the
ethical considerations involved, by ensuring that the client received
disinterested, independent advice, and by having the will witnessed by
strangers to whom the client spoke her mind.143
Ohio nevertheless continued the trend towards ethical sanctions
for such practices. In Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Ramey,144 the Ohio
Supreme Court declared that an attorney who had prepared a trust
agreement and will under which he stood to inherit his client's entire
estate had violated EC 5-5, and that a public reprimand was war-
ranted.145 Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court suspended for six
months an attorney-guardian who had drafted a will for his ward
134. Id. at 555 (White, J., concurring in the result).
135. 257 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1971).
136. Id. at 8.
137. 71 Ill. 2d 263, 375 N.E.2d 102 (1978).
138. Id. at 276, 375 N.E.2d at 107.
139. Id. at 274-75, 375 N.E.2d at 106.
140. 92 Ill. 2d 55, 440 N.E.2d 885 (1982).
141. See id. at 65-66, 440 N.E.2d at 890.
142. 87 IlM. 2d 233, 429 N.E.2d 842 (1981).
143. Id. at 239-40, 429 N.E.2d at 846. See also Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp. v.
Dean, 95 Ill. 2d 452, 448 N.E.2d 872 (1983).
144. 32 Ohio St. 2d 91, 290 N.E.2d 831 (1972).
145. Id. at 98, 290 N.E.2d at 835. The attorney also misrepresented the irrevocable
nature of the trust instrument to his client. Id. at 99, 290 N.E.2d at 836.
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which named the attorney and his family as beneficiaries. 146
As time went on, courts increasingly began to lose patience with
attorneys who engaged in such conduct. For instance, the Supreme
Court of Iowa indefinitely suspended an attorney's license to practice
law because the attorney had drafted a will in which he was named
merely as contingent beneficiary.14 7 The court went so far as to con-
clude, perhaps incorrectly, that attorneys were not free to view the
ethical considerations of the Model Code as merely aspirational in na-
ture, because the ethical considerations were part of an integrated unit
of professional rules of behavior.148 In doing so, the Iowa court
adopted a line of reasoning which was to surface again in a later Penn-
sylvania case. 149 The Colorado Supreme Court also suspended an at-
torney's license for ninety days because he did not provide truly
independent counsel to verify his client's wishes in naming him as
beneficiary.150
Even North Dakota, which had previously utilized the "no pre-
sumption of undue influence" rule, finally indicated that its stance on
the matter was rapidly changing. In a case where an attorney tried in
vain to dissuade his client from insisting on having him draw a will in
which the attorney was named a beneficiary, the Supreme Court of
North Dakota wrote:
We hasten to add that we recommend attorneys do not draft wills in which
they are named beneficiary. [Although] we do not adopt the strict position of
the Wisconsin court ... , in the future attorneys will have difficulty in convinc-
ing us of the "unusual circumstances" which justify their drafting a will in
which they are named as a beneficiary.1 5
1
The trend towards the professional responsibility rationale in de-
ciding that an attorney should not be permitted to act as scrivener-
beneficiary, however, was not always a smooth one. The caselaw in
Pennsylvania, for example, illustrates how some courts were con-
strained to retain probate considerations in dealing with the problem.
146. In re Krotenberg, 111 Ariz. 251, 527 P.2d 510 (1974).
147. Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n v.
Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa 1979).
148. Id. at 840. See also Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa
State Bar Ass'n v. Randall, 285 N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1979) (former president of ABA
disbarred after naming himself as beneficiary under client's will), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 946 (1980).
149. See infra text accompanying note 152.
150. State v. Berge, 620 P.2d 23, 24-25 (Colo. 1980).
151. Disciplinary Bd. v. Admundson, 297 N.W.2d 433, 442 (N.D. 1980). See In re Pru-
eter, 359 N.W.2d 613 (Minn. 1984) (attorney who made himself or a member of his
family a beneficiary in a will he prepared was guilty of misconduct warranting
public reprimand); Professional Ethics Comm. of the Bar Ass'n of Greater Cleve-
land, Op. 148 (July 22, 1983), Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801:6951
at p. 93 [1980-1985 Ethics Opinions].
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In Estate of Younger,15 2 an attorney, after drawing several wills for
a testator over the course of a few years, drafted a final will for his
client in which the attorney was named as a primary beneficiary. The
contestants of the will, objected to the probate of the will on grounds
of undue influence. 53 Because the rule in Pennsylvania was that no
presumption of undue influence would arise unless the attorney were
to receive the bulk of the estate from a client whose "intellect was
weakened,"154 the bequest to the attorney was upheld by the probate
judge, as well as the Orphans' Court, because the testator had been
adjudged of sound mind.
However, on appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated the
probate order.155 Although the attorney argued, somewhat inge-
niously, that his conduct should have been judged by disciplinary,
rather than probate, standards, and that EC 5-5 did not have the force
of law, the superior court disagreed. Using the Model Code as a touch-
stone, the court averred that the Code had the force of statutory rules
of conduct for attorneys,156 and could actually overrule prior
caselaw.157 The court therefore ruled that a presumption of undue
influence always arose whenever an attorney received a gift under a
will that he drafted for a client, and could be rebutted only by clear
and convincing evidence.15 8
The rationale of the superior court in Younger, however, was later
overruled by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in In re Estate of Pe-
drick.15 9 In the Pedrick case, an attorney wrote out a will for a termi-
nally ill, in extremis testator which left the testator's entire estate to
the attorney and the attorney's brother.160 Although Pennsylvania
does not require that a will be witnessed in order to be valid,161 the
attorney did not take the relatively simple precaution of having some-
one else confirm the testator's wishes.162 Relying on the Younger
holding that the canons and ethical considerations of the Model Code
152. 314 Pa. Super. 480, 461 A.2d 259 (1983).
153. Id. at 483-84, 461 A.2d at 260.
154. Estate of Reichel, 484 Pa. 610, 614, 400 A.2d 1268, 1270 (1979). See Boyd v. Boyd, 66
Pa. 283 (1870).
155. Estate of Younger, 314 Pa. Super. 480, 496, 461 A.2d 259, 267 (1983).
156. Id. at 489, 461 A.2d at 263 (citing American Dredging Co. v. City of Philadelphia,
480 Pa. 177, 183, 389 A.2d 568, 571 (1978)).
157. Id. at 488, 461 A.2d at 263. For a critique of the Younger case, see Note, Estate of
Younger: Violation of an Ethical Consideration Equals a Legal Presumption, 45
U. PiTT. L. REv. 719 (1984).
158. Estate of Younger, 314 Pa. Super. 480, 494, 461 A.2d 259, 266 (1983).
159. 505 Pa. 530, 482 A.2d 215 (1984).
160. Id. at 533-34, 482 A.2d at 216-17.
161. Pennsylvania merely requires proof of the authenticity of the signature by two
persons familiar with the testator's signature. See 1 R. REMICK, PENNSYLVANIA
ORPHAN'S COURT PRACTIcE § 3.05, at 98 (rev. ed. 1975).
162. In re Estate of Pedrick, 505 Pa. 530, 534-38, 482 A.2d 215, 217-18 (1984).
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had the weight of substantive law, the contestant argued that the at-
torney had the obligation of proving by clear and convincing evidence
that the gift was the result of the testator's own volition, and not of
the attorney's undue influence.163 But, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court disagreed. In fact, the Pedrick court expressly rejected the su-
perior court's earlier ruling that the Model Code could be used to alter
substantive law, noting that disciplinary action must originate with
the proper authorities.164 Equitable considerations of unconscionabil-
ity were instead used to prevent the lawyer from receiving the gift.165
When the attorney in Younger tried once again to proceed with
probate of his client's will, the Pennsylvania Superior Court was
forced to return to probate considerations of undue influence, because
the attorney had not acted unconscionably in any way.166 Noting that
the evidence failed to show that the testator suffered from a "weak-
ened intellect,"167 the superior court upheld the gift to the attorney-
scrivener.
The Pennsylvania cases show how little uniformity actually ex-
isted among the states in confronting the problem. The cases also in-
dicated that some courts continued to operate in a vacuum,
particularly in light of the developments which had occurred and
were occurring in this area of the law.
IV. REFORM, BUT APPARENT ONLY
The trend towards reaching an all-encompassing ethical standard
for sanctioning the conduct of an attorney who is named as a benefici-
ary under a will which she drafts for a client culminated with the
adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and, specifically,
Rule 1.8(c), by the American Bar Association in 1983.168
The new Model Rules were prepared and adopted by the ABA for
several reasons. The structure of the Model Code, which contains gen-
eralized canons, aspirational ethical considerations, and mandatory
disciplinary rules, had not held up well in practice. For instance, little
uniformity existed among courts regarding treatment of the interre-
lated parts of the Model Code, with canons and ethical considerations
often employed as substantive rules in disciplinary proceedings, which
was not the original intent of the drafters of the Model Code.169 More-
over, the Code format had not been unanimously adopted by all juris-
163. Id. at 541, 482 A.2d at 220.
164. Id. at 542-43, 482 A.2d at 221.
165. Id. at 545-46, 482 A.2d at 223.
166. See Estate of Younger, 352 Pa. Super. 414, 420-21, 508 A.2d 327, 330 (1986).
167. Id.
168. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(c) (1983).
169. See Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, 107
A.B.A ANN. REP. 408-10 (1982).
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dictions. For example, some states, such as California, Oklahoma,
Massachusetts, Illinois, Maine, and Michigan, had adopted the Model
Code sans ethical considerations. 70 In addition, the canons of the
Code were often at odds with the ethical considerations, which in turn
sometimes conflicted with its disciplinary rules.171 Furthermore, the
broad statements often made in the Model Code were frequently too
generalized to provide the specific guidance attorneys needed. The
Model Rules were therefore adopted in a restatement format to im-
press upon the profession a uniform set of standardized rules which
would be easily comprehensible to attorneys. Indeed, failure to com-
ply with the new rules warranted disciplinary action.1 72
In many ways, however, the overall tenor of the Model Rules is
similar to that of the Model Code. Lawyers should act in furtherance
of the public good rather than to protect personal concerns. 7 3 Among
other things, the attorney's duty to his client is supreme. Above all,
lawyers are to treat their profession, and its attendant duties,
honorably.
Concerning the specific problem of the attorney as both scrivener
of and beneficiary under a will, Rule 1.8(c), "Conflict of Interest: Pro-
hibited Transactions," located under the general category and head-
ing, "Client-Lawyer Relationships," states: "A lawyer shall not
prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the
lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a
client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related
to the donee."174
The comment to Rule 1.8, although not authoritative, 175 further
advises:
As a general principle, all transactions between client and lawyer should
be fair and reasonable to the client. In such transactions a review by in-
dependent counsel on behalf of the client is often advisable....
A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general
standards of fairness. For example, a simple gift such as a present given at a
holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. If effectuation of a substan-
tial gift requires preparing a legal instrument such as a will .... however, the
client should have the detached advice that another lawyer can provide. Para-
graph (c) recognizes an exception where the client is a relative of the donee or
the gift is not substantial.
1 7 6
170. Id. The need for uniformity was considerable, as in situations where the testator




173. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsi-
bilities (1983).
174. Id. Rule 1.8(c).
175. See id. Preamble.
176. Id., Rule 1.8(c) comment.
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There is no question that Model Rule 1.8(c) makes great strides in
confronting the problem head-on. First and foremost, by the terms of
the rule, a determination of whether undue influence was exerted by
the lawyer is no longer relevant to the propriety of such a gift. Such
conduct is now disallowed from an ethical standpoint rather than from
a probate one, because the prohibition on testamentary gifts is point-
edly noted. The most noticeable specific reform is that the former as-
pirational guide of EC 5-5 of the Model Code has now become a
seemingly flat ethical prohibition in the Model Rules, with limited ex-
ceptions. Rule 1.8(c) also appears to codify some of the earlier ap-
proaches previously taken by a few jurisdictions, especially that of
Wisconsin, with respect to the exception for non-substantial gifts and
wills drawn for relatives.177
In fact, at first glance, the rule appears to provide clear guidance to
the lawyer who is confronted with the situation in which a client
wishes to name him a beneficiary under a will which the attorney
drafts. Such conduct on the part of the attorney is now grounds for
disciplinary action. For instance, an attorney is now clearly prohibited
from acting as scrivener-beneficiary in order to receive a "fee" in the
form of a bequest so that he may be taxed on it at the lower inheri-
tance rate. However, a closer inspection of the rule reveals that the
section has been poorly drafted, and the apparently "minor" excep-
tions present some major problems. Indeed, the section may in fact
only assist the good-faith attorney whose client insists that she draft a
will in which the attorney is named as a beneficiary, by flatly prohibit-
ing the attorney from doing so, and by allowing her to say "no" to her
client.
Rule 1.8(c) deals only with instruments prepared for the client. It
therefore does not prevent an attorney from allowing a client to make
a gift causa mortis to her in order to circumvent the rule. Although
the proof problems inherent in proving this type of gift are considera-
ble, they are not insurmountable. Indeed, the Louisiana statutory pro-
hibition preventing physicians and ministers from accepting
testamentary or quasi-testamentary giftsll8 could have served as a use-
ful guide in this context. More importantly, under the language of the
rule, an attorney would be permitted to name her fiance or another
intimate friend as beneficiary under a will she drafts for a client, since
the rule only prohibits the attorney from naming her parents, chil-
dren, siblings, or spouse(s), in addition to herself, as beneficiaries.
More problematic is the exception that is made when the gift is not
"substantial." But, nowhere is the word "substantial" adequately de-
177. See State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963); State v. Collentine, 39
Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d 50 (1968).
178. 5 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1489 (West 1987).
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fined.179 Although the comment to Rule 1.8 attempts to clarify the
situation, it actually provides little guidance. Since "substantial"
means considerable in amount or value,180 exactly what constitutes a
"substantial" gift? Is it measured by its value in relation to the entire
estate, or independently thereof? Although the Preamble to the
Model Rules does note that the Rules are rules of reason, the Pream-
ble is not a substantive part of the Model Rules,18 and therefore what
is considered reasonable, or substantial, by one attorney or client may
not be so considered by another, depending on his station in life and
various other factors18 2 The section also allows an exception where
the lawyer is "related" to the client-donee. Unfortunately, "related" is
nowhere defined, either. In the field of estate law, the category of
"relative" can be quite large, and can encompass not only linear ances-
tors and descendants, but collaterals as well, including those of the
third, fourth, or even fifth degree. Is the term's definition to be gov-
erned by state intestacy statutes, or otherwise? Taken at face value, a
lawyer could apparently justify the behavior of naming himself as a
beneficiary under a client's will which he drafts if he could demon-
strate that he was a relative of the client-donor, however distant.
Finally, nowhere does the rule prohibit a partner or associate of
the attorney-beneficiary from drafting the will in a formal sense only,
as a mere strawman in the transaction. Again, the Comment is help-
ful on this point, but not authoritative. Since the potential for over-
reaching on the part of attorneys always exists, it is unfortunate that
the Rule itself does not contain specific language in order to prevent
this type of conduct.
Rather than solving the problem at issue, then, the Model Rules
may well have created some difficult new ones. Rule 1.8(c) also may
not end the controversy over what is and is not ethical conduct on this
point for another reason: not every jurisdiction may adopt the Rule.
Although some twenty-two states have already adopted the Model
Rules in toto,183 and several others have recommended adoption of the
179. See Johnston, An Ethical Analysis of Common Estate Planning Practices-Is
Good Business Bad Ethics?, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 57 (1984), who has voiced similar
criticisms of Model Rule 1.8(c) purely within the context of an ethical perspec-
tive. Id. at 73-75, 78-79. See also ANNOTATED MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.8(c) (1984) (legal background section).
180. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 2280 (3d ed. 1981).
181. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1983).
182. It is interesting to note, in this regard, that the word "substantial" was added to
Rule 1.8(c) in its drafting stages at the recommendation of the American College
of Trial Lawyers, Section of Estate and Trust Law, and the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York (Committee on Trusts, Estates, and Surrogates Courts).
See Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, 107
A.B.A. ANN. REP. 831 (1985).
183. Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana,
Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
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Rules or parts thereof,18 4 New York has refused to do so, 185 while Ver-
mont has pointedly recommended against adoption.86 Whether
Model Rule 1.8(c) will truly result in greater uniformity and consis-
tency, then, is, at best, only a possibility.1 8 7 Because there appears to
be no caselaw on point of as yet with respect to application of Model
Rule 1.8(c) in practice, emergent caselaw and opinions of the American
Bar Association Ethics Committee may perhaps shed more light on
the problematic areas of the rule at some point in the near future.
V. CONCLUSION: AN INESCAPABLE SOLUTION
Over the last three decades, probate considerations have given way
to ethical ones in determining whether an attorney may draft a will
for a client in which the attorney is named as a beneficiary. Although
the earlier decisions were unsettled, the later ones, for the most part,
established a presumption of undue influence for such conduct, which
the attorney could rebut, but usually only with clear and convincing
evidence. Gradually, a transition in the law occurred in which courts
began to view such conduct as an ethical problem rather than a pro-
bate issue. With the advent of the Model Code, some progress was
made towards regulating the conduct of attorneys confronted with
such situations. The Model Rules later routinized the ethical concerns
by constructing an apparently strict prohibition against the practice.
All state bar associations should move to adopt Rule 1.8 as quickly
as possible. Each state must realize that uniformity and consistency
are essential in order to preserve a cohesive and coherent system of
ethics clearly apprehensible to the public. The Model Rules are at
least a first step in realizing this goal.
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Virginia, Washington and
Wyoming have all adopted the Model Rules, with amendments not relevant
hereto. See [ Current Reports] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 3
(April 15, 1987).
184. These jurisdictions include District of Columbia, [1 Current Reports] Law. Man.
on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 71 (Feb. 22, 1984); Illinois, [1 Current Reports] Law.
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 881 (July 24, 1985); Michigan, [1 Current
Reports] Law. Man. on Prof Conduct (ABA/BNA) 70 (Feb. 22, 1984); Penn-
sylvania, [2 Current Reports] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 17 Jan. 25,
1984); South Carolina, [1 Current Reports] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct 1006 (Oct.
16, 1985); Utah, [ Current Reports] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 881
(July 24, 1985); and Wisconsin, [1 Current Reports] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 630 (Feb. 6, 1985).
185. [1 Current Reports] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 1047 (Nov. 13,
1985).
186. [1 Current Reports] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 855 (July 10, 1985).
187. Of course, one of the problems with establishing uniform rules in the professional
responsibility or probate area is that regulation of both fields is a matter of state,
rather than federal, law. To a certain extent, then, it is nearly impossible to have
complete uniformity among the jurisdictions.
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The Model Rule at issue, however, does not go far enough. The
logical endpoint of the transition process from probate considerations
to ethical concerns points inevitably towards a clearcut solution to the
problem. Thus, the rule of choice should mandate that under no cir-
cumstances may an attorney draft a will for a client in which the attor-
ney is named as a beneficiary, without exception.1 8 8 Furthermore, if
the client still wishes to proceed with the gift, the rule should require
that a truly independent attorney draft the instrument. Thus, a will
or provision thereof drawn in violation of the rule would be consid-
ered void and not probatable.
A blanket rule such as the one described has many advantages.
Without such a rule, attorneys will be forever suspect in the eyes of
the public, no matter how scrupulously the transactions are handled,
for even good faith drafting favors can invite disaster for the image of
the profession by engendering lengthy and expensive will contests.
Lawyers belong to one of the last of the honored professions, and they
should strive to uphold that honor. Moreover, by forcing the attorney
to send her client to another lawyer of the client's own choosing, the
client has a greater opportunity to obtain truly meaningful and disin-
terested counsel and insight into the planned disposition, ensuring
that the client's testamentary intent remains steadfast despite possible
outside influences. Were it otherwise, no one could ever be relatively
certain of the testator's true intent. The rule should be the same even
for members of the attorney's own family, especially considering the
propensity for sibling and parental rivalry and jealousy following the
death of a loved one. In addition, the lawyer cannot possibly give her
undivided loyalty to her client if she is to be the recipient of a testa-
mentary gift from a family member-client under a will which she is
drafting. Even token testamentary gifts to the attorney-scrivener
should be prohibited, for "token" is as difficult to define as "substan-
tial," varying greatly in meaning, depending on the context. After all,
whether an antique pocket watch or a classic car is a token gift de-
pends entirely on circumstance.
Part of the need for a blanket rule is the overwhelming appearance
of impropriety which exists whenever an attorney receives payment
for drafting a testamentary instrument for a client which names the
attorney as beneficiary. The practice places the attorney in a very dif-
ficult conflict of interest situation. As the Model Code rightly pointed
out in EC 5-2: "A lawyer should not accept proffered employment if
his personal interests ... will, or there is a reasonable probability that
188. Interestingly, the original version of the Model Rules contained just such an abso-
lute prohibition. See Johnston, supra note 179, at 80-82, who also considers such a
rule, but only within the context of other possible rules, and not as an advocate
for any one particular position. See also Comment, Considerations of Professional
Responsibility in Probate Matters, 51 NEB. L. REv. 456, 471-73 (1972).
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they will, affect adversely the advice to be given or services to be ren-
dered the prospective client."189 Disciplinary Rule 5-101(A), entitled
"Refusing Employment When the Interests of the Lawyer May Impair
His Independent Judgment," went on to state: "[A] lawyer shall not
accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on be-
half of the client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own
financial . . . or personal interests."190 Along the same lines, the
Model Rules later noted, in Rule 1.7(b): "A lawyer shall not represent
a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited
... by the lawyer's own interests ... ."191
More to the point, the Model Rules recognize that lawyers should
give truly independent advice to their clients.192 However, such advice
often necessarily includes notions of morality as well as legality. As
one commentator has noted, lawyers must assume personal moral re-
sponsibility for the consequences of their professional actions.1 93 Per-
haps with this in mind, Rule 2.1 states: "In representing a client, a
lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render
candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law
but to other considerations such as moral .... factors, that may be
relevant to the client's situation."194 The comment to Rule 2.1 goes on
to point out: "[A] lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid
advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the cli-
ent."195 The Model Rules, then, at least tacitly lend support for such a
blanket rule.
In the final analysis, however, the practice of an attorney drafting a
will for a client in which the attorney is named as a beneficiary should
not be tolerated in any form because it is an easily avoidable problem.
The inconvenience to the client in consulting another attorney is so
small as compared to the benefits achieved that such a rule simply
makes good, practical sense. Nor would economic considerations often
be a serious problem for the client, considering the current availability
of legal assistance services and the relatively low cost of having a will
drafted. As for the client who at first refuses to consult another attor-
ney, he simply will have no other choice but to acquiesce if he desires
189. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-2 (1969).
190. Id. DR 5-101(A).
191. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1983).
192. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1983).
193. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STANFORD L. REV. 589, 643
(1985).
194. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1983).
195. The Model Code advised lawyers similarly. EC 7-8 states, in relevant part:
Advice of a lawyer to his client need not be confined to purely legal con-
siderations.... In assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often
desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors which may lead to a
decision that is morally just as well as legally permissible.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1980).
[Vol. 66:695
1987] DRAFTING ATTORNEY IS A BENEFICIARY 725
competent legal drafting and advice. Given the choice between no ad-
vice and sound advice, most, if not all, clients will choose the latter.
Besides, lawyers have a responsibility to give sound advice to their cli-
ents, no matter how annoying or distasteful it may be. Whether such
an ironclad rule will eventually gain acceptance, however, remains up
to courts and legislatures, and, ultimately, attorneys themselves.
